tomorrow's military is projected to look much the same as today's (2002) ." 3 Her assessment that U.S. military strategy for the future was being supported by a force structure that still resembled the cold war force structure was a common post-Cold War criticism. 4 Transformation should be more than the introduction of new technology, more than simply modernizing our force -it should take a holistic approach to change. Joint Vision 2020 stresses the "…development of doctrine, organization, training and education, leaders and people who take advantage of technology." 5 If transformation is based solely on the introduction of technological advances, the U.S. military incurs grave risks in the future. Hans Binnendijk, Roosevelt Professor of National Security Policy at the National Defense University and former senior director of the National Security Council for defense policy and arms control, in Transforming America's Military, and Douglas MacGregor, in Transformation Under Fire, speak to the importance of transformation in the development of new operational concepts and organizational designs which promote joint aspects of the services. 6 7 The process designed to provide these capabilities to the Department is the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). The CCJO is a process through which Joint Operating Concepts (JOC), Joint Functional Concepts (JFC), and Joint Integrating Concepts (JIC) are developed with the goal of providing capabilities to be utilized by the joint force across the wide range of military options. 22 The Department of Defense's CCJO envisions a transformed "…joint force that will support achieving strategic objectives…" and defines "…(t)he military contribution to this strategy (as) a joint force with a broad array of capabilities that can be employed to prevent and deter crises, defeat any adversary and control, or help control any situation -full spectrum dominance."
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As stated, the CCJO defines the process for the development of JOCs, JFCs, and JICs.
This family of concepts, "…postulates potential areas where the joint force and other elements within the U.S. government may find common ground in which to best integrate their efforts." 24 JOCs describe "…how a future joint force commander will plan, prepare, deploy, employ, and sustain a joint force against potential adversaries' capabilities or crisis situations specified within the range of military operations. JOCs serve as 'engines of transformation' to guide the development and integration of joint functional and service concepts to describe joint capabilities." (including land force divisions, carrier and other major combatant vessels, air wings, and other comparable units) needed to meet these threats, and the anticipated levels of funding that will be available for national defense purposes during such period." 36 The second tenet was the eight final BRAC Selection Criteria, of which the first four addressed military value. Specifically, the four criteria assessed, "…current and future mission capabilities…including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness"; "…(t)he availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace…"; "(t)he ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements…"; and "(t)he cost of operations and the manpower implications." 37 Options would emerge from the analysis of data and be reviewed by Service or JCSG leadership with some receiving approval to be forwarded as recommendations. Lastly, all recommendations were to be based on certified data. As required by Public Law 101-510, all people submitting data were required to certify that the data submitted was accurate and complete to the best of their knowledge and belief. "…essential elements of military judgment…" that were provided to the Services and JCSGs for their application in the deliberative BRAC process. 38 With the above analytic framework in place, the analytic process addressed data collection through the establishment of recommendations. The first step in this process was the collection of capacity data that provided current, maximum and surge capacity of installations and DOD facilities. This data helped to identify the domain in which each analytical team operated. The second step in the process was the collection and analysis of military value data.
Military value was quantified by applying attributes, weights, and metrics to the set of questions derived from the four military value selection criteria. Military judgment was not precluded from this portion of the analysis. This was achieved through the qualitative and subjective assessment of the application of the BRAC Principles through the military value criteria. The
Chairman of the Infrastructure Steering Group described this as an "…exercise of military judgment built upon a quantitative analytical foundation." 39 With capacity and military value data in hand, recommendation development followed.
There were two avenues available to the development of recommendations. The first was a data-driven optimization modeling while the second was a strategy-driven approach. In addition to applying the data from the capacity and military value analyses, the Services and JCSGs with the BRAC statute, IGPBS moves could not be included within the BRAC process unless they could be tied to a BRAC realignment action within the U.S. 46 The Army's IGPBS recommendation and its transformational quality will be analyzed later in this paper.
As with the Army, the Air Force used the BRAC process to effect transformation by reshaping its force structure. The Air Force strategy was to "…increase effectiveness and reduce excess infrastructure and capacity by realigning and right sizing operational and support units." 47 Guiding the Air Force process were the following four goals:
• "Transform by maximizing the warfighting capability of each squadron,
• Transform by realigning Air Force infrastructure with future defense strategy,
• Maximize operational capability by eliminating excess physical capacity, and
• Capitalize on opportunities for joint activity."
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The last goal is also captured in an Air Force Basing Principle which is to "(e)nsure joint basing Fighter recommendation in a later section.
The Navy was guided by a strategy that "…sought to rationalize and consolidate infrastructure capabilities to eliminate unnecessary excess, balance the effectiveness of fleet concentrations with anti-terrorism/force protection desires for dispersion of assets and redundancy of facilities, leverage opportunities for total force laydown and joint basing, accommodate changing operational concepts, and facilitate the evolution of force structure and infrastructure organizational alignment." 51 Supporting this strategy were the Navy's principles to "…eliminate excess capacity, save money, improve operational readiness and jointness, and maintain quality of service." 52 In adhering to the final BRAC Selection Criteria, it is obvious that efficiencies to be gained through BRAC actions producing joint solutions would be of high value with all three services.
Additionally, each Service's set of principles provide common themes such as promoting joint ventures, increasing capabilities for the future warfighter, and eliminating excess infrastructure.
These themes are can be seen nested within the OSD overall strategy found within the 58 In support of the JCSGs overarching strategy, the sub-functional areas established ten additional guidelines. Three of these apply to the Transportation Command recommendation discussed later in this paper. These recommendations project net savings of $2.6 billion with a $1.2 billion dollar recurring savings after the implementation period. 63 The Air Force stated in its summary report that "…(b)y capitalizing on joint opportunities where it makes sense, reducing inefficiencies, and retaining valuable community-based resources to recruit and retain quality people, the Air Force can modernize and recapitalize -developing the capabilities needed to meet 21 st century threats." Utilizing joint solutions to achieve efficiencies will be seen in the JSF recommendation that will be analyzed in the following section.
The Navy BRAC 2005 process generated 187 recommendations that affected 344 activities. These recommendations, along with the JCSG recommendations involving Navy activities and installations project $2.6 billion in net savings. This may result in an annual recurring savings of $1.6 billion after the implementation period. The Navy provided these figures in constant 2006 dollars. 64 Through these recommendations, the Navy endeavored to "…rationalize and consolidate infrastructure capabilities to eliminate unnecessary excess;
balance the effectiveness of Fleet concentrations with anti-terrorism/force protection desires for dispersion of assets and redundancy of facilities; leverage opportunities for total force laydown and joint basing; accommodate changing operational concepts; and facilitate the evolution of force structure and infrastructure organizational alignment." Defined as "…the integrated use of maneuver and engagement to create the effects necessary to achieve assigned mission objectives…," 75 this concept is also supported by the modular force concept. A key capability of the FA JFC is maneuver. Defined as "…the movement of forces into and through the battlespace to a position of advantage in order to generate or enable the generation of effects on the enemy," this capability represents the speed and initiative of force.
To achieve this advantage on the future battlefield, the FA JFC states that "…expeditionary joint forces must be modular in design so they can be quickly tailored to meet a wide range of contingencies." 76 The Army is engaged in its most important restructuring process of the past half century.
The goals to be realized by this process are the rebalancing of the force, the stabilization of the force, the improvement of business practices, and the restructuring from a division-based force to a brigade-based force. By achieving these goals, the Army is transforming to meet the future threat. By forwarding the Operational Army (IGPBS) BRAC recommendation, the Army is utilizing the BRAC process to support the MCO JOC and FA JFC through establishing and promoting the modular force concept. The transformational quality of this recommendation is that it is supportive of the Army's transformation vision of basing its structure around a more powerful, lethal, flexible force that can operate in an autonomous, joint or multinational environment. jointly' national perspective to the learning process." 80 As with the Army's modular force concept, the JSF supports the MCO JOC by providing a capability that can achieve superiority in the air by "…setting the conditions for decisive conclusion of the confrontation…(and by)…using joint, interdependent forces to swiftly apply overmatching power…" 81 This BRAC recommendation clearly supports a core, foundational building block of the MCO JOC to "(u)se a coherent joint force that decides and acts based upon pervasive knowledge." 82 Additionally, an initial joint training site for the services meets the FA JFC attributes of lethal, synchronized, discriminating, predictive, networked, tailorable, agile, tactically dominant, persistent, and survivable. 83 Though eliminating the need for three training sites, the creation of a single, joint training site, more importantly provides joint initial training for a warfighting platform that meets FA JFC capabilities of maneuver and engagement in a joint perspective which will serve the joint force commander operating in a joint environment.
BRAC has taken a common function, JSF initial pilot training, and applied its analytical process to identify a base of military value on which to establish a joint function. JFC is "…to build sufficient capacity into the deployment and sustainment pipeline, exercise sufficient control over the pipeline from end to end, and provide a high degree of certainty to the supported joint force commander that forces, equipment, sustainment, and support will arrive where needed and on time." 86 In addition to providing cost savings from systems and personnel reductions, the consolidation of headquarters will provide a synergistic effect in the command and control of the strategic logistics environment by promoting "…deployment, employment, and sustainment situational awareness…" and by establishing a "…coherently joint logistics common relevant operational picture…" 87 An objective of the FL JFC can be found in "…developing integrated architectures used for analyzing joint logistics capabilities." 88 TRANSCOM, as the owner of the strategic mobility architecture, has taken an initial step in achieving this objective with a joint, transformational recommendation to consolidate service components to help streamline its processes.
The transformation quality to this recommendation goes beyond the synergies gained, the duplication eliminated, and the creation of streamlined headquarters processes to increase overall awareness within strategic transportation. The collocation of the Army and Air Force service components onto Scott AFB, home of Transportation Command, is a change in the way we organize and a move from a service-centric culture to one that is joint. The expressed need to exist as a stand-alone service headquarters should be questioned. Secondly, future changes to the Department's infrastructure and force structure should be reviewed with the joint focus that was central to the BRAC process. Utilizing a BRAC-like framework, transformational gains, like those proposed in the three recommendations presented in this paper, can be realized.
Lastly, to support our capabilities-focused Department, all change should support Joint Operational Concepts. In doing so, future change will continue to support our military's superiority in the future. BRAC 2005, through its Services and JCSGs, will potentially provide savings in the billions of dollars. But, more importantly, this process has served as an enabler for the continuing process of transformation within the Department of Defense.
